Abstract. In the conference PKC'98, Shin et al. proposed a dedicated hash function of the MD family. In this paper, we study the security of Shin's hash function. We analyze the property of the Boolean functions, the message expansion, and the data dependent rotations of the hash function. We propose a method for finding the collisions of the modified Shin's hash function and show that we can find collisions with probability 2 −30 .
Introduction
Hash functions are used for many cryptographic applications, such as message authentication and digital signature. A hash function is a computationally efficient function which maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length. Cryptographic hash functions should satisfy the following properties [3] :
-pre-image resistance: given a y in the image of a hash function h, it is computationally infeasible to find any pre-image x such that h(x) = y. -2nd pre-image resistance: given x and h(x), it is computationally infeasible to find a x = x such that h(x) = h(x ). -collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x, x which hash to the same output.
Since the hash function MD4 [6] was introduced by R. Rivest, many dedicated hash functions based on design principles of MD4 have been proposed. MD5 [7] , HAVAL [10] , RIPEMD [5] , RIPEMD-160 [2] , and SHA-1 [4] are the dedicated hash functions of the MD family.
In the conference PKC'98, Shin et al. proposed a dedicated hash function of the MD family [8] . We call it Shin's hash function. The compression function of Shin's hash function processes a message block of 512 bits and consists of 4 rounds. Each of the rounds consists of 24 steps. Shin's hash function employs the message expansion similar to SHA-1, and Boolean functions similar to HAVAL. Another feature of Shin's hash function is to adopt the data-dependent rotations: rotations are processed by variable amounts determined by message words.
In this paper, we study the security of Shin's hash function. We analyze the property of the Boolean functions, the message expansion, and the data dependent rotations of Shin's hash function. We indicate that, unlike the designer's intention, some of the Boolean functions of Shin's hash function fail to satisfy the Strict Avalanche Criterion(SAC) [9] . Also, we point out that there can be some weakness of the message expansion and the data dependent rotations. We consider the modified Shin's hash function which is Shin's hash function whose Boolean functions all satisfy the SAC, and propose a method for finding the collisions for the modified Shin's hash function.
2 The compression function of Shin's hash function Throughout this paper, the symbol + represents a modulo 2 32 addition, X ⊕ Y , X ∧ Y and X ∨ Y represent the bitwise exclusive OR, AND, and OR of X and Y , respectively. The symbol X s denotes the left cyclic shift of X by s bit positions to the left.
The compression function of Shin's hash function processes a 16-word message block of 512 bits, (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 15 ), and consists of 4 rounds. The 16-word message block is expanded to a 24-word message block, (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 23 ). In the 24-word message block, X i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 15) are the same as the message words of the original 16-word message blocks and the additional 8 message words, X i (i = 16, 17, · · · , 23) are determined by the 16-word message blocks as follows:
With the expanded 24-word message block, the compression function transforms a 5-word(160 bits) initial value (A, B, C, D, E) into a 160-bit output value. The 5-word initial values are the followings:
Each round of the compression function consists of 24 steps and each step processes a different word. The orders in which the words are processed differ from round to round. The word processing orders are determined by the following: In addition, each round employs a different constant. The constant K i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is adopted by i-th round.
In each round, one of the following Boolean functions is employed.
The Boolean functions perform bitwise operations on words. f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , f 0 are adopted by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th round, respectively. Now, we describe the step function of Shin's hash function. Let T i,j (j = 0, 1, · · · , 4) be the input of the step function at step i. Then, the step function of Shin's hash function has a transformation of the form
The rotation amount s i at the step i is determined by the following:
where ord(i) is determined by the following permutations: In this section, we analyze the property of the Boolean functions, the message expansion, and the data dependent rotations of Shin's hash function.
The property of the Boolean functions
The designers of Shin's hash function claimed that each of the Boolean functions of the hash function is 0-1 balanced, has a high nonlinearity, and satisfies the SAC [8] . Yet, it is easy to find out that some of the Boolean functions of Shin's hash function fail to satisfy the SAC. We define the Boolean function f as satisfying the SAC if whenever one input bit of f is changed, each output bit is changed with probability 1/2 [9] . In case of Shin's hash function, it is easy to know that the Boolean function f 0 and f 1 do not satisfy the SAC. In case of f 0 , we can know that, whenever the input bit, x 5 , is changed, the output bit is changed with probability 1. Similarly, in case of f 1 , whenever the input bit, x 2 , is changed, the output bit is changed with probability 1.
Since the designers of Shin's hash function intended that each of the Boolean functions satisfies the SAC, it can be adequate that we consider the Shin's hash function whose Boolean functions all satisfy the SAC. We call it the modified Shin's hash function.
The property of the message expansion
The additional 8 message words X 16 , X 17 , · · · , X 23 are determined by the 16-word message block by the equation (1) . The equation (1) can be restated as follows:
For two 32-bit words X andX, we will define the difference of X andX as follows:
To find a collision for Shin's hash function, we should find two distinct message blocks X andX which have the same hash value. In the two distinct message blocks X andX, if non-zero difference occurs between X i andX i (0 ≤ i ≤ 15), non-zero difference can occur between some of the additional 8 message words which are generated from X i andX i . For example, if non-zero difference occurs between X 0 andX 0 , then non-zero difference can occur between X 16 and X 16 . Furthermore, non-zero difference between X 16 andX 16 can make non-zero difference between X 20 andX 20 . Thus, the message expansion can increase the difficulty of finding collisions for the hash function. Table 1 shows the property of the message expansion of Shin's hash function. It shows that X 10 and X 15 affect X 19 and X 23 simultaneously. It means that, although ∆X 10 and ∆X 15 are non-zero, we can have ∆X 19 = ∆X 23 = 0 in the case X 10 = X 15 andX 10 =X 15 . Similarly, although ∆X 17 , ∆X 21 , and ∆X 22 are non-zero, we can have ∆X 8 = ∆X 13 = 0 in the case X 17 ⊕ X 21 ⊕ X 22 = 0 andX 17 ⊕X 21 ⊕X 22 = 0. X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15  X16 X17 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X16 X17 X18 X19  X20 X21 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X20 X21 X22 X23  X20 X21 X22 X23  X20 X21 X22 X23  X21 X22 X23  X21 X22 X23  X22 X23 X23
Now, we know that there are instances in Shin's hash function where non-zero difference between some original message words cannot be diffused to non-zero difference between some additional message words. We can use this property of the message expansion to find the collisions for the modified Shin's hash function.
The property of the data dependent rotations
In Shin's hash function, the data dependent rotations are adopted by the equation
at step i. We can know that in the 1st round, ord(i) is determined by the word processing orders of the 4th round, and ord(i) of the 2nd round is determined by the word processing orders of the 3rd round, and so on.
For example, at step 1, s 1 is determined by the word X 13 (see Appendix A). So, if we have the word X 13 such that X 13 = 0 mod 32, then, s 1 = 0. It means that we can make the data dependent rotations ineffective by choosing the appropriate message block, i.e. if we have the message block (X i , i = 0, 1, . . . , 15) such that X i = 0 mod 32, we can have all s i equal to 0.
Also, if we have X i andX i such that ∆X i = 0 and X i =X i mod 32, then we know that the shift amounts determined by X i andX i are the same although X i andX i are different.
Attack on the modified Shin's hash function
Although some of the Boolean functions of Shin's hash function do not satisfy the SAC, since the designers of Shin's hash function intended that each of the Boolean functions satisfies the SAC, it seems to be adequate that we study the security of the modified Shin's hash function. In this section, we propose a method for finding the collisions for the modified Shin's hash function.
We define some notations. A i , B i , C i , D i , E i represent the chaining variables after step i for a message block X = (X 0 , . . . , X 23 ), andÃ i ,B i ,C i ,D i ,Ẽ i represent the chaining variables after step i for a message blockX = (X 0 , . . . ,X 23 ). s i ands i represent the shift value used in step i for X andX, respectively.
Attack on the 6 consecutive steps of the modified Shin's hash function
We analyze the 6 consecutive steps of the modified Shin's hash function and show how to find the collisions for 6 consecutive steps. For convenience, we consider the 6 consecutive steps from step 1 to step 6. To find the collisions for 6 consecutive steps, we should find two distinct message blocks X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 5 ) andX = (X 0 ,X 1 , . . . ,X 5 ) which have the same chaining variables after step 6, i.e. A 6 =Ã 6 , B 6 =B 6 , C 6 =C 6 , D 6 =D 6 , and, E 6 =Ẽ 6 .
We consider two distinct message blocks X andX such that ∆X 0 = 1
31
and ∆X 1 = ∆X 2 = ∆X 3 = ∆X 4 = ∆X 5 = 0. Then, we can have a situation that s i =s i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6). We assume that A 0 =Ã 0 , B 0 =B 0 , C 0 =C 0 , D 0 =D 0 , and, E 0 =Ẽ 0 . Note that the Boolean function f satisfies the SAC. Now, we analyze each step from step 1 to step 6 and find the probability with which (X,X) can be a collision of the 6 consecutive steps. Table 2 shows the updated chaining variables at each step of the 6 consecutive steps. The boxed variables represent the updated chaining variables at each step. Table 2 . chaining variables updated in each step
Step A0 B0 C0 D0 E0 Input message 1 A1 B1 C1 D1 E1 X0
2 A2 B2 C2 D2 E2 X1
ABCDEX2
4 A4 B4 C4 D4 E4 X3
ABCDEX4
6 A6 B6 C6 D6 E6 X5
A 1 andÃ 1 are updated at step 1 as follows:
Since ∆X 0 = 1 31 , we can have a situation that X 0 ⊕X 0 = 1 31 with probability 1. Also, we know that ∆A 0 = ∆B 0 = ∆C 0 = ∆D 0 = ∆E 0 and s 1 =s 1 . So, we have the following:
At step 2, E 2 andẼ 2 are updated as follows:
Since ∆E 1 = ∆B 1 = ∆C 1 = ∆D 1 = 0, ∆X 1 = 0, s 2 =s 2 , we can have the following equation:
Note that A 1 ⊕Ã 1 = 1 s1(ors1)−1 . Since f satisfies the SAC, we can have a result such that f (E 1 , A 1 , B 1 , C 1 , D 1 ) = f (E 1 ,Ã 1 , B 1 , C 1 , D 1 ) with probability 1/2, i.e. ∆E 2 = 0 with probability 1/2.
We assume that we have ∆E 2 = 0 at step 2. At the next step, D 3 andD 3 are updated as follows:
Since ∆D 2 = ∆E 2 = ∆B 2 = ∆C 2 , ∆X 2 = 0, and s 3 =s 3 , we can have the following equation:
Since f satisfies the SAC, we can have a result such that
with probability 1/2, i.e. ∆D 3 = 0 with probability 1/2.
Similarly, we can have that ∆C 4 = 0 with probability 1/2 at step 4. Also, we can have that ∆B 5 = 0 with probability 1/2 at step 5, and ∆A 6 = 0 with probability 1/2 at step 6.
As a result, for two distinct message blocks X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 5 ) andX = (X 0 ,X 1 , . . . ,X 5 ) such that ∆X 0 = 1 31 and ∆X 1 = ∆X 2 = ∆X 3 = ∆X 4 = ∆X 5 = 0, we can have that ∆A 6 = 0, ∆B 6 = 0, ∆C 6 = 0, ∆D 6 = 0, ∆E 6 = 0 with probability 2 −5 . So, we can find a collision for the 6 consecutive steps of the modified Shin's hash function with about 2 5 operations.
Attack on the full steps of the modified Shin's hash function
Now, we propose a method for finding a collision for the full steps of the modified Shin's hash function. We consider two distinct message blocks X = (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 15 ) andX = (X 0 ,X 1 , . . . ,X 15 ) which satisfy the following conditions.
-Condition 1 : X i is arbitrary for i = 8, 9, and 10.
-Condition 2 : X 8 = 0x00000016 and X 9 = X 2 ⊕ X 4 ⊕ X 14 ⊕ 0x0000000b -Condition 3 : X 10 = X 15 -Condition 4 :X i = X i for i = 10, 15 -Condition 5 :X 10 =X 15 = X 15 + 1 Condition 2 implies that X 8 = 22 mod 32 and X 18 = 22 mod 32. So, the shift amounts determined by X 8 and the shift amounts determined by X 18 are equal to 22. From Condition 3, 4, and 5, we can have that X i =X i (i = 16, 17, · · · , 23) from the property of the message expansion. Also, since X i =X i mod 32(0 ≤ i ≤ 23), it is easy to know that s i =s i (1 ≤ i ≤ 96). Finally, we notice that ∆X 10 = ∆X 15 = 1 31 . We denote I i as the section of the 6 consecutive steps from step i to step i + 5 and consider the sections I 11 , I 32 , I 43 , I 54 , I 69 , and, I 81 . Note that the first input message word of the sections is X 10 or X 15 , and ∆X 10 = ∆X 15 = 1 31 (see Appendix A).
First, we consider the section I 32 . We have two distinct message blocks (X 10 , X 5 , X 16 , X 8 , X 0 , X 20 ) and (X 10 ,X 5 ,X 16 ,X 8 ,X 0 ,X 20 ) such that ∆X 10 = 1 31 and ∆X 5 = ∆X 16 = ∆X 8 = ∆X 0 = ∆X 20 = 0. So, to the section I 32 , we can apply the attack on the 6 consecutive steps of the modified Shin's hash function, i.e. if ∆A 31 = ∆B 31 = ∆C 31 = ∆D 31 = ∆E 31 = 0, we can have ∆A 37 = ∆B 37 = ∆C 37 = ∆D 37 = ∆E 37 = 0 with probability 2 −5 . Similarly, the attack on the 6 consecutive steps can be applied to I 43 , I 54 , and I 69 with the same probability.
However, to the section I 11 , the attack on the 6 consecutive steps cannot be directly applied because ∆X 15 = 0, where X 15 andX 15 are the input message words of the last step of I 11 . However, by using the property of the data dependent rotations, this problem can be solved. Note that, at step 16, A 16 andÃ 16 are updated as follows: with probability 1/2. So, ∆A 16 = 0 with probability 2 −5 . Similarly, by using the property of the data dependent rotations, this attack can be applied to the section I 81 . In this case, by the value of X 8 in Condition 2, we have that s 81 =s 81 = 22.
As our main result, if we have the two distinct message blocks X andX which satisfy the Condition 1,2,3,4, and 5, we can find a collision of the modified Shin's hash function with probability (2 −5 ) 6 = 2 −30 . Now, we find a collision of the modified Shin's hash function by computer simulation. We employ the Boolean functions f i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) which satisfy the SAC as follows: , 1, 2, 3) is the modified version of the Boolean function f 2 of Shin's hash function, which satisfies the SAC. Note that our attack does not use the specific properties of the Boolean functions except the SAC.
As a result of computer simulation, we give a collision for the modified Shin's hash function in Table 3 which has the following hash value: 0xdfe4e58f, 0x1f21fb34, 0x9956457f, 0x8726dff2, 0x0a45bef3 Table 3 . A collision for the modified Shin's hash function X0 = 0xe64ec066X0 = 0xe64ec066 X1 = 0xfd126b95X1 = 0xfd126b95 X2 = 0x6d80c03eX2 = 0x6d80c03e X3 = 0x09d32e0cX3 = 0x09d32e0c X4 = 0x767d3ff5X4 = 0x767d3ff5 X5 = 0x2bc1b633X5 = 0x2bc1b633 X6 = 0x40727b94X6 = 0x40727b94 X7 = 0xd7e17540X7 = 0xd7e17540 X8 = 0x00000016X8 = 0x00000016 X9 = 0x278364e1X9 = 0x278364e1 X10 = 0xe7e7d228X10 = 0x67e7d228 X11 = 0x8014bf7dX11 = 0x8014bf7d X12 = 0xd5a3b0deX12 = 0xd5a3b0de X13 = 0x5a70ffd6X13 = 0x5a70ffd6 X14 = 0x3c7e9b21X14 = 0x3c7e9b21 X15 = 0xe7e7d228X15 = 0x67e7d228
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the security of Shin's hash function proposed by Shin et al. in the conference PKC'98. We have pointed out that, unlike the designer's intention, some of the Boolean functions of Shin's hash function do not satisfy the SAC. Also, we have indicated that there are instances in Shin's hash function that the message expansion is not effective. We have proposed a method for finding the collisions with probability 2 −30 for the modified Shin's hash function. Furthermore, we have found a collision of the modified Shin's hash function by computer simulation.
Recently, the collisions of the original Shin's hash function have been found by Chang et al.. They have extended our attack, and the complexity of the attack is 2 37 hashing operations [1] . This paper has provided a good example that, although it is known that the SAC is one of the important properties of the cryptographic Boolean functions, it can be absolutely irrelevant for the dedicated hash functions. So, we recommend that the Boolean functions of the dedicated hash function of the MD family be carefully chosen. Also, the message expansion should be carefully designed, and we conjecture that the data dependent rotations seem to be inadequate for the dedicated hash functions.
